I debatten om homosexualitet används ofta begreppet ”det kristna kärleksbudskapet” – att älska sin nästa som sig själv - som synonymt med att acceptera och tolerera alla människor och grupper utan fördömande. De som sägs förstå kärleksbudskapet sämst är de som kallar sig själva kristna eftersom de inte förstår denna synonymitet. Det de inte förstår är vad de själva påstår sig hålla dyrt och heligt, nämligen acceptans, men i praktiken så motsäger de sig själva genom att vara fördömande mot dem som har en homosexuell läggning.
Det torde vara allmänt känt att i en debatt, vilken som helst, överdrivs ofta de viktigaste synpunkterna i stridens hetta. Den som har opinionsöverläge kan vanligtvis driva hem sina poänger relativt friktionsfritt utan högre krav på stringens. Den som är i underläge ägnar tanken mest åt ordval för att undvika politiskt inkorrekta uttryck som leder till en återvändsgränd. Detta är den osakliga debattens dynamik. Oftast blir debatten därför snedvriden, och syftar mest att förstärka de båda sidornas övertygelser mer. M.a.o. det är inte vad en saklig debatt, och än mindre en ’dialog’ – detta populärord som vi använder så ofta som det goda samtalets främsta dygd -, syftar till. En debatt syftar till att göra två motsatta ståndpunkter klara och genom argumentation se vilken som har starkast stöd. Det finns inte någon som har ett opinionsöverläge utan båda sidor kan skrida framåt på lika villkor.
Retoriskt (i den ovan nämnda debatten om kärleksbudskapet) använder ofta de som har övertaget en vanlig anklagelse: att de kristna inte är öppna för dialog. D.v.s., den samtalsform som syftar till att två likvärdiga ståndpunkter eller perspektiv ska byta ut information för att lära sig av varandra och inte övertyga med argument. Båda sidor är här inte bara långt från den sakliga debattens dynamik utan ännu längre från dialogens verklighet. Dubbelt ironiskt blir det när samtalet handlar om kärleksbudskapet - att älska sin nästa som sig själv - vilket sägs vara synonymt med ett slags universell acceptans av alla människor oavsett åsikt.
Ett sådant humaniserat kärleksbudskap är kanske en bra, men knappast en direkt kristen, livsregel som i allmänhet delas med de etablerade religionerna i världen, i varje fall i praktiken. Att Gud är kärlekens Gud, eller att kärlek är ett centralt religiöst begrepp, är inte en exklusivt kristen trosföreställning. Eftersom kärlek är något universellt gott varför skulle man vilja förringa eller lämna det ute i ett framgångsrikt religiöst system? Frågan som vi snarare bör ställa oss är denna: Är den kristna gestaltningen av kärlek annorlunda från andra religioner och gudsföreställingar?
Ofta glöms det uppenbara kriteriet för att ett kärleksbudskap ska vara kristet bort - att Gud är den som älskar och ska älskas först och hur detta uppenbarats för oss i Jesus Kristus. Det som gör kristen etik kristen är Kristus själv. Skulle det vara Kristus som debatten handlade om vore det hela kanske mer intressant att lyssna på. I så fall handlar det om att inte bara påstå att ”Jesus sa..” utan att underbygga påståenden med mer än vaga hänvisningar till halvt påhittade bibelverser. Detta förfarande skulle kasta ljus över om en humanistisk och en kristen kärlekstanke har ömsesidigt överlappande beståndsdelar eller om de är diametralt motsatta. Jag skulle gissa att det skulle leda till det senare – visa dess olikheter, men på ett sakligt sätt.
Å andra sidan hyser jag inga illusioner att detta sakligt orienterade samtal kan realiseras i någon större utsträckning. Anledningen är ganska enkel - en kristen kan inte göra korset, vilket är en oundviklig del i det kristna kärleksbudskapet, till en allmänt accepterad idé, d.v.s. ta bort korsets anstöt då man talar om Guds kärlek. Men jag tror däremot inte att den kristne kan komma undan med att hänvisa till korsets dårskap då han själv har lurat in sig i en återvändsgränd, när han har gått med på att han behöver visa sig oskyldig till en diffus retorik vill göra gällande. Snarare tror jag att kristna bör vara ”oskyldiga som duvor och listiga som rävar”. Detta betyder i praktiken att inte ge den rätt som säger att man per definition är skyldig om man är kristen och behöver försvaras sig. Snarare handlar det om i allt visa sin oskuld genom att tala med klokhet och råd men utan att försvara sig. Bäst görs detta genom att att ställa motfrågor och inte svara på pseudoinvändningar mot ens tro. Många invändningar kommer då att falla innan de ens har hunnit dra till sig någon större attraktion. Dessutom kommer kanske den verkliga debatten då snarare handla om centrum istället för det som i det stora hela är tämligen perifert även om det är viktigt. Vill man inte hellre lida (om det nu kommer till det) för Kristus som kristen, än för en snedvriden debatt om sexualetik?
Friday, 8 August 2008
Richard Muller on Zanchi's Doctrine of God
When discussing the problem of order among the attributes for the early reformed orthodox theologians, Richard A. Muller says Zanchi’s ordering
…presupposes the doctrine of Trinity and sees the attributes in terms of Triniatrian and Christological issues. Not only does Zanchi’s De tribus Elohim precede his De Natura Dei seu attributes in the order of his collected works, the form and pattern of argument in the De natura Dei assumes the doctrine of the Trinity as underlying the discussion both of the divine nature in general and of the attributes in particular; and there are continual references, throughout the work, to the way in which the various attributes must be understood in a Trinitarian context. Thus, Zanchi argues that he shown, in the former treaties, De tribus Elohim, who (quis) God is – Father, Son, and Spirit – he must next discuss what manner or sort (quails) of being God is; this, he argues, is the burden of the doctrine of the divine essence or nature and attributes. (Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, III, pp. 162 f.)
It is not immediately obvious to me what Muller is getting at here, since he does not substantiate his claim further. But given the direction of this interpretation, we might aks, what would a Trinitarian and Christological ordering of the attributes imply for theological predication? Would, for instance, an attribute like omniscience be qualified by the Trinity? If so, what would that look like?
It seems to me that Muller’s statement that the attributes are to be seen against Trinitarian and Christological issues might be slightly overstated. What I think is the case is rather that Trinitarian and Christological issues are laboured on in light of the nature and specific attributes of God. There are certainly “references, throughout the work”, but not straightforwardly, “to the way in which the various attributes must be understood in a Trinitarian context” as Muller says.
E.g. when discussing divine infinity and immensity (De Natura Dei, IV) Zanchi brings in a longer discussion about the communicatio idiomatum. Now this discussion was brought in due to the debate between Lutherans and reformed on the relationship between the two natures of Christ. Especially the notion of ubiquity became important since the debate emanated from the previous debate on the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper. Many Lutherans insisted that the divine presence or the attribute of ubiquity was communicated to the human nature of Christ and therefore the body and blood of Christ was present in the sacramental elements. Zanchi introduces a number of distinctions with regards to immensity, time and space and therefore makes it clear that in no relevant way was divine immensity communicated to the human nature so that Christ in his physical body was present everywhere.
Now this brief consideration indicates that Muller has overstated the treatment of the divine attributes in Zanchi. The order of analysis is not as clearly from Trinitarian/Christological to the divine nature. In the example given above the order is rather the opposite. But if this would be my only evidence it would have been a quite weak argument on my behalf. Let us therefore first come back to the basic the quis-qualis distinction. Zanchi says it is a matter of method at the outset of De Natura Dei:
We will postulate a true and methodical order of doctrine so that when we have satisfactory knowledge of who [quis] God is from Sacred Scripture – what belongs truly to God, who is eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit – we will treat how [quails] the nature or attributes as they are taught in Sacred Scripture.
Now this passage is something that at first hand could look like it is supporting Muller’s understanding but after a second reading we might come to understand that the method talked of here is not necessarily as integrated as Muller portrayed it. Zanchi is not saying that the divine attributes are to be understood in some qualified sense from the persons. Rather, the order of Scriptural knowledge should proceed from quis to quails since what really exists (in a Thomistic metaphysics) are the persons who all have the same simple Divine nature. The movement of the ratio docendi is from diversity of persons to unity in nature and not the other way around. Yet this movement does not in any straightforward way warrant the conclusion that the nature and attributes are to be seen through the diversity of persons since the unity is talking about what is common to all persons and the diversity what is peculiar to each person. Hence the ontological primacy of persons over nature seems to me one of the more important features of the relationship between De Tribus Elohim and De Natura Dei. Once that relationship is established, in a systematic context, we can safely proceed to talk about the nature or attributes, as Zanchi says.
This is saying something different from what Muller says it does. It is saying that Trinitarian considerations are not informing questions about the divine nature so that the attributes are directly qualified by the persons, rather the persons and their operations are “conditioned” by the simple and undivided nature. But in the order of doctrine we have to start with the three supposita since this is what God is.
One might posit a sort of Rahnerian style critique of the order of, say, the order of doctrine in the Summa Theologica, which puts Locus de Deo before Locus de Trinitate and thereby downplaying the radical nature of a Christian conception of God. In that way Zanchi is a better Rahnerian than a Thomist since he is inclined to put quis before quails. I am not sure that neither Aquinas nor Zanchi would have understood the dichotomy here since one could very well start elsewhere, in sacred doctrine, than (with principles of theology and then to) the nature of God. But what then of a true order of doctrine? The problem only becomes a problem if one assumes that the chronological presentation re-present the only true pattern for dogmatic exposition. Here is where I think the problem lies. Why should we assume that chronology must be identical with dogmatic content and emphasis? In the absence of any weightier reason than what Muller has produced, I am not sure that we should pay too much dogmatic attention to Zanchi’s initial remarks to De Natura Dei.
…presupposes the doctrine of Trinity and sees the attributes in terms of Triniatrian and Christological issues. Not only does Zanchi’s De tribus Elohim precede his De Natura Dei seu attributes in the order of his collected works, the form and pattern of argument in the De natura Dei assumes the doctrine of the Trinity as underlying the discussion both of the divine nature in general and of the attributes in particular; and there are continual references, throughout the work, to the way in which the various attributes must be understood in a Trinitarian context. Thus, Zanchi argues that he shown, in the former treaties, De tribus Elohim, who (quis) God is – Father, Son, and Spirit – he must next discuss what manner or sort (quails) of being God is; this, he argues, is the burden of the doctrine of the divine essence or nature and attributes. (Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, III, pp. 162 f.)
It is not immediately obvious to me what Muller is getting at here, since he does not substantiate his claim further. But given the direction of this interpretation, we might aks, what would a Trinitarian and Christological ordering of the attributes imply for theological predication? Would, for instance, an attribute like omniscience be qualified by the Trinity? If so, what would that look like?
It seems to me that Muller’s statement that the attributes are to be seen against Trinitarian and Christological issues might be slightly overstated. What I think is the case is rather that Trinitarian and Christological issues are laboured on in light of the nature and specific attributes of God. There are certainly “references, throughout the work”, but not straightforwardly, “to the way in which the various attributes must be understood in a Trinitarian context” as Muller says.
E.g. when discussing divine infinity and immensity (De Natura Dei, IV) Zanchi brings in a longer discussion about the communicatio idiomatum. Now this discussion was brought in due to the debate between Lutherans and reformed on the relationship between the two natures of Christ. Especially the notion of ubiquity became important since the debate emanated from the previous debate on the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper. Many Lutherans insisted that the divine presence or the attribute of ubiquity was communicated to the human nature of Christ and therefore the body and blood of Christ was present in the sacramental elements. Zanchi introduces a number of distinctions with regards to immensity, time and space and therefore makes it clear that in no relevant way was divine immensity communicated to the human nature so that Christ in his physical body was present everywhere.
Now this brief consideration indicates that Muller has overstated the treatment of the divine attributes in Zanchi. The order of analysis is not as clearly from Trinitarian/Christological to the divine nature. In the example given above the order is rather the opposite. But if this would be my only evidence it would have been a quite weak argument on my behalf. Let us therefore first come back to the basic the quis-qualis distinction. Zanchi says it is a matter of method at the outset of De Natura Dei:
We will postulate a true and methodical order of doctrine so that when we have satisfactory knowledge of who [quis] God is from Sacred Scripture – what belongs truly to God, who is eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit – we will treat how [quails] the nature or attributes as they are taught in Sacred Scripture.
Now this passage is something that at first hand could look like it is supporting Muller’s understanding but after a second reading we might come to understand that the method talked of here is not necessarily as integrated as Muller portrayed it. Zanchi is not saying that the divine attributes are to be understood in some qualified sense from the persons. Rather, the order of Scriptural knowledge should proceed from quis to quails since what really exists (in a Thomistic metaphysics) are the persons who all have the same simple Divine nature. The movement of the ratio docendi is from diversity of persons to unity in nature and not the other way around. Yet this movement does not in any straightforward way warrant the conclusion that the nature and attributes are to be seen through the diversity of persons since the unity is talking about what is common to all persons and the diversity what is peculiar to each person. Hence the ontological primacy of persons over nature seems to me one of the more important features of the relationship between De Tribus Elohim and De Natura Dei. Once that relationship is established, in a systematic context, we can safely proceed to talk about the nature or attributes, as Zanchi says.
This is saying something different from what Muller says it does. It is saying that Trinitarian considerations are not informing questions about the divine nature so that the attributes are directly qualified by the persons, rather the persons and their operations are “conditioned” by the simple and undivided nature. But in the order of doctrine we have to start with the three supposita since this is what God is.
One might posit a sort of Rahnerian style critique of the order of, say, the order of doctrine in the Summa Theologica, which puts Locus de Deo before Locus de Trinitate and thereby downplaying the radical nature of a Christian conception of God. In that way Zanchi is a better Rahnerian than a Thomist since he is inclined to put quis before quails. I am not sure that neither Aquinas nor Zanchi would have understood the dichotomy here since one could very well start elsewhere, in sacred doctrine, than (with principles of theology and then to) the nature of God. But what then of a true order of doctrine? The problem only becomes a problem if one assumes that the chronological presentation re-present the only true pattern for dogmatic exposition. Here is where I think the problem lies. Why should we assume that chronology must be identical with dogmatic content and emphasis? In the absence of any weightier reason than what Muller has produced, I am not sure that we should pay too much dogmatic attention to Zanchi’s initial remarks to De Natura Dei.
Friday, 11 April 2008
Article from Dagen, January 2008 (uneited and in Swedish)
Kan man skapa en Religion?
Reflektioner över Svensk andlighet
Tro det eller ej men ’andlighet’ är inne igen i Sverige. Nyligen avslutades en TV-serie från SVT – ’Jonas och Musses Religion’. Den handlade om två vanliga män mellan 30 och 40 – Jonas och ”Musse” - båda programledare för barnprogram på svensk TV, som fick i uppgift att starta en egen religion på 60 dagar. Båda hade kvar sin ”oskuld” i religiöst avseende vilket tog sig uttryck i att de båda hade tämligen begränsad kunskap om vad religion kan vara. De började därför träffa religiösa utövare från olika religioner samt några specialister som en religionshistoriker (som blev deras mentor) och en psykoterapeut. En av många saker som var intressant med detta lättsamma men ändå seriösa program var deras metod, eller kanske avsaknad av metod. De följde enbart sina egna känslor. Religionen de ”skapade” blev således ett sätt att uppfylla deras egen (som det visade sig) stora känslomässiga hunger efter bekräftelse och trygghet. Detta reflekterar en vanlig syn på religion i den moderna världen efter religionskritiker alltifrån Karl Marx till Ingemar Hedenius i Sverige – religionen är ett skapat instrument för någon form av självuppfyllelse. Programmet är m.a.o. en exposé av ett medärvt och idag nästan okontroversiellt sätt att se på religion i Sverige och stora delar av västvärlden.
Detta ställer oss inte inför frågan om vi är intresserade av andlighet idag utan snarare av vilken sorts andlighet. För Jonas och Musse var det naturligt att söka sig österut för att kunna söka byggstenarna till sin religion, till Indien närmare bestämt. Ända sedan början av deras andliga sökande i första programmet sökte de efter något bortomvärldsligt, asketiskt, något som de inte hade varit med om förut. Religion och andlighet, resonerade de, ska inte ha något med denna världen att göra utan med en annan, gärna en inre som känns. Återigen reflekterar detta en mycket vanlig uppfattning om vad religion är – något heligt, avskilt från ”världen” och vår vardag. Enligt denna uppfattning råder det en uppdelning mellan världsligt och andligt.
Denna allmänna och ofta outtalade uppfattning har i Sverige fungerat till att privatisera all religion – ”Jag tror på min Gud”. 1900-tals försöket, ’folkkyrkan’, kan tyckas gå emot denna privatisering av religionen med sin devis att kyrkans gränser är Sveriges gränser. Problemet är att en sådan religiös struktur lever ett parasitliv på något annat, nämligen samhället. Det är folket, samhället som bestämmer vad som är religiöst eller andligt. I dag måste den svenska folkyrkan vara lika öppen för intryck som det pluralistiska samhället i vilket vi befinner oss. Detta praktiskt sett omöjliga, eller åtminstone mycket komplicerade, förhållande mellan kyrka och samhälle har lärt oss att inte diskutera religionens sanning utan endast mångtydiga begrepp som ’religiös tolerans’. Samtidigt bevittnar vi ett allt växande intresse för religion och andlighet i det sekulära Sverige i media och böcker – från Dan Browns Da Vinci koden till Karen Armstrongs böcker om religion. Trots att Sverige är ett av världens mest sekulära land gäckar, upprör och förbryllar det kristna arvet ännu svensken mer än mycket annat. Visst, vi är sekulära och fredsälskande, men vi är inte så bortom allt religiöst som vi ofta vill påskina. Givetvis har saker som Ecce homo och Knutbytragedin varit bidragande i detta tvetydiga förhållande till andlighet i det att de gett religionskritiker (av olika falanger) mer att tala och skriva om.
En annan, kanske mindre uppenbar sak, är det mänskliga behovet av identitet. Svensken är idag på en rastlös jakt efter identitet. Det finns förmodligen få andra saker än religion, och etniskt ursprung, som är så identitetsskapande. Ta bort en av dessa och man förlorar sin identitet. Fortfarande lever upplysningsmyten om en ny friare värld utan religion för det är en värld utan krig som John Lennon sjöng tillsammans med hela världen på 60-talet. I dag kan vi inte längre säga att vi är kristna för att vi är ifrån Sverige, mer än i en urvattnad mening av att vi har ett Lutherskt kulturarv och arbetsmoral (det senare torde inte ha mycket av substans kvar). Men samtidigt detta oroliga identitetssökande som ofta går till andligheten för att finna kraft. New Agerörelsen har fungerat som ett kristendomssurrogat för svenskarnas hunger. Idag är Sådan andlighet allmängods, närmast en folkreligion. Så på så sätt är svensken enormt religiös men New Age verkar inte ha tillräckligt med kraft att kunna ge mer än en mindre skara den identitetskapande funktion som många söker inom religionen.
Vi befinner oss i ett motsatsförhållande – å ena sidan vill vi ha en tydligare
identitet som innefattar någon form av anlighet men å andra sidan utan religion för att vi har lärt oss att religionen är våldsam och naiv - särskilt i sina klassiska former som kristendom och Islam.
Religion är således ett begrepp som lockar och som skrämmer. Värt att notera i detta sammanhang är att Sveriges Radios nya parallellprogram till det populära Filosofiska Rummet kommer att kallas Teologiska Rummet. Termen ’teologi’ har under mer än 100 år varit djupt ifrågasatt från religionskritikens håll. Är då religion som verkligt alternativ på väg tillbaka? I varje fall är intresset för religion, även i dess klassiska former, inte borta. Svaret på den frågan bidar i framtiden. Det förefaller som att religion måste kunna svara på samtidens utmaningar.
Låt oss återkomma till Jonas och Musse. Det finns något talande vad gäller samtidens syn på religion uttryckt i deras religionsbygge. Vid ett tillfälle var de hemma på fredagsmåltid hos en bekännande judisk yngre familj. De blev medbjudna i det mycket jordiska och världstillvända praktiserandet av att tillaga och äta mat i en gemenskap i tacksamhet till ”Universums Skapare”. Men detta var inte andligt eller religiöst nog för Jonas och Musse. Det var inte privat eller asketiskt nog för deras religiösa intuitioner. De kunde inte ta in att religion är världsligt och gemenskapsfrämjande. ”Äta mat tillsammans kan vi ju göra ändå, det behöver vi ju ingen religion för”, var deras inställning på väg till parkeringsplatsen på fredagskvällen. Deras ”slutgiltiga” religion blev en individualistisk pastisch av österländska religionselement som var allt annat än världstillvänt.
Här tror jag vi finner ett verkligt exempel på hur märkligt vår kultur har kommit att tänka på religionens roll. Ska det finnas en framtid för religionen måste uppdelningen mellan andligt och världsligt utmanas. Kristna har varit duktiga på att göra en sådan bodelning med alltifrån mediokra till fruktansvärda resultat. Det är denna uppdelning som gör tron oattraktiv för de utomstående och utarmad för den kristne. Att äta tillsammans har i den judisk-kristna traditionen visat på en enhet mellan andligt och världsligt men en enhet som man kan gå förbi om man har för bråttom att komma bort från ”världen”. Den kristna tron bekräftar detta djupt mänskliga i det att Gud själv åt tillsammans med oss och inbjuder än idag till förrätt inför den verkliga Festen. Det är i den här världen vi kommer att lära känna nästa värld eftersom det råder en kontinuitet mellan dem. De fösta kristna blev inte förföljda för att de var religiösa våldsverkare eller fanatiker utan för att de genom sin skandalösa bekännelse till kroppens uppståndelse retade gallfeber på det filosofiska och religiösa tempramentet hos sin samtid. Romarnas Israel för 2000 år sedan, eller Sverige idag, gör det samma – en Andlighet som är livstillvänd är både lockande och skrämmande.
Reflektioner över Svensk andlighet
Tro det eller ej men ’andlighet’ är inne igen i Sverige. Nyligen avslutades en TV-serie från SVT – ’Jonas och Musses Religion’. Den handlade om två vanliga män mellan 30 och 40 – Jonas och ”Musse” - båda programledare för barnprogram på svensk TV, som fick i uppgift att starta en egen religion på 60 dagar. Båda hade kvar sin ”oskuld” i religiöst avseende vilket tog sig uttryck i att de båda hade tämligen begränsad kunskap om vad religion kan vara. De började därför träffa religiösa utövare från olika religioner samt några specialister som en religionshistoriker (som blev deras mentor) och en psykoterapeut. En av många saker som var intressant med detta lättsamma men ändå seriösa program var deras metod, eller kanske avsaknad av metod. De följde enbart sina egna känslor. Religionen de ”skapade” blev således ett sätt att uppfylla deras egen (som det visade sig) stora känslomässiga hunger efter bekräftelse och trygghet. Detta reflekterar en vanlig syn på religion i den moderna världen efter religionskritiker alltifrån Karl Marx till Ingemar Hedenius i Sverige – religionen är ett skapat instrument för någon form av självuppfyllelse. Programmet är m.a.o. en exposé av ett medärvt och idag nästan okontroversiellt sätt att se på religion i Sverige och stora delar av västvärlden.
Detta ställer oss inte inför frågan om vi är intresserade av andlighet idag utan snarare av vilken sorts andlighet. För Jonas och Musse var det naturligt att söka sig österut för att kunna söka byggstenarna till sin religion, till Indien närmare bestämt. Ända sedan början av deras andliga sökande i första programmet sökte de efter något bortomvärldsligt, asketiskt, något som de inte hade varit med om förut. Religion och andlighet, resonerade de, ska inte ha något med denna världen att göra utan med en annan, gärna en inre som känns. Återigen reflekterar detta en mycket vanlig uppfattning om vad religion är – något heligt, avskilt från ”världen” och vår vardag. Enligt denna uppfattning råder det en uppdelning mellan världsligt och andligt.
Denna allmänna och ofta outtalade uppfattning har i Sverige fungerat till att privatisera all religion – ”Jag tror på min Gud”. 1900-tals försöket, ’folkkyrkan’, kan tyckas gå emot denna privatisering av religionen med sin devis att kyrkans gränser är Sveriges gränser. Problemet är att en sådan religiös struktur lever ett parasitliv på något annat, nämligen samhället. Det är folket, samhället som bestämmer vad som är religiöst eller andligt. I dag måste den svenska folkyrkan vara lika öppen för intryck som det pluralistiska samhället i vilket vi befinner oss. Detta praktiskt sett omöjliga, eller åtminstone mycket komplicerade, förhållande mellan kyrka och samhälle har lärt oss att inte diskutera religionens sanning utan endast mångtydiga begrepp som ’religiös tolerans’. Samtidigt bevittnar vi ett allt växande intresse för religion och andlighet i det sekulära Sverige i media och böcker – från Dan Browns Da Vinci koden till Karen Armstrongs böcker om religion. Trots att Sverige är ett av världens mest sekulära land gäckar, upprör och förbryllar det kristna arvet ännu svensken mer än mycket annat. Visst, vi är sekulära och fredsälskande, men vi är inte så bortom allt religiöst som vi ofta vill påskina. Givetvis har saker som Ecce homo och Knutbytragedin varit bidragande i detta tvetydiga förhållande till andlighet i det att de gett religionskritiker (av olika falanger) mer att tala och skriva om.
En annan, kanske mindre uppenbar sak, är det mänskliga behovet av identitet. Svensken är idag på en rastlös jakt efter identitet. Det finns förmodligen få andra saker än religion, och etniskt ursprung, som är så identitetsskapande. Ta bort en av dessa och man förlorar sin identitet. Fortfarande lever upplysningsmyten om en ny friare värld utan religion för det är en värld utan krig som John Lennon sjöng tillsammans med hela världen på 60-talet. I dag kan vi inte längre säga att vi är kristna för att vi är ifrån Sverige, mer än i en urvattnad mening av att vi har ett Lutherskt kulturarv och arbetsmoral (det senare torde inte ha mycket av substans kvar). Men samtidigt detta oroliga identitetssökande som ofta går till andligheten för att finna kraft. New Agerörelsen har fungerat som ett kristendomssurrogat för svenskarnas hunger. Idag är Sådan andlighet allmängods, närmast en folkreligion. Så på så sätt är svensken enormt religiös men New Age verkar inte ha tillräckligt med kraft att kunna ge mer än en mindre skara den identitetskapande funktion som många söker inom religionen.
Vi befinner oss i ett motsatsförhållande – å ena sidan vill vi ha en tydligare
identitet som innefattar någon form av anlighet men å andra sidan utan religion för att vi har lärt oss att religionen är våldsam och naiv - särskilt i sina klassiska former som kristendom och Islam.
Religion är således ett begrepp som lockar och som skrämmer. Värt att notera i detta sammanhang är att Sveriges Radios nya parallellprogram till det populära Filosofiska Rummet kommer att kallas Teologiska Rummet. Termen ’teologi’ har under mer än 100 år varit djupt ifrågasatt från religionskritikens håll. Är då religion som verkligt alternativ på väg tillbaka? I varje fall är intresset för religion, även i dess klassiska former, inte borta. Svaret på den frågan bidar i framtiden. Det förefaller som att religion måste kunna svara på samtidens utmaningar.
Låt oss återkomma till Jonas och Musse. Det finns något talande vad gäller samtidens syn på religion uttryckt i deras religionsbygge. Vid ett tillfälle var de hemma på fredagsmåltid hos en bekännande judisk yngre familj. De blev medbjudna i det mycket jordiska och världstillvända praktiserandet av att tillaga och äta mat i en gemenskap i tacksamhet till ”Universums Skapare”. Men detta var inte andligt eller religiöst nog för Jonas och Musse. Det var inte privat eller asketiskt nog för deras religiösa intuitioner. De kunde inte ta in att religion är världsligt och gemenskapsfrämjande. ”Äta mat tillsammans kan vi ju göra ändå, det behöver vi ju ingen religion för”, var deras inställning på väg till parkeringsplatsen på fredagskvällen. Deras ”slutgiltiga” religion blev en individualistisk pastisch av österländska religionselement som var allt annat än världstillvänt.
Här tror jag vi finner ett verkligt exempel på hur märkligt vår kultur har kommit att tänka på religionens roll. Ska det finnas en framtid för religionen måste uppdelningen mellan andligt och världsligt utmanas. Kristna har varit duktiga på att göra en sådan bodelning med alltifrån mediokra till fruktansvärda resultat. Det är denna uppdelning som gör tron oattraktiv för de utomstående och utarmad för den kristne. Att äta tillsammans har i den judisk-kristna traditionen visat på en enhet mellan andligt och världsligt men en enhet som man kan gå förbi om man har för bråttom att komma bort från ”världen”. Den kristna tron bekräftar detta djupt mänskliga i det att Gud själv åt tillsammans med oss och inbjuder än idag till förrätt inför den verkliga Festen. Det är i den här världen vi kommer att lära känna nästa värld eftersom det råder en kontinuitet mellan dem. De fösta kristna blev inte förföljda för att de var religiösa våldsverkare eller fanatiker utan för att de genom sin skandalösa bekännelse till kroppens uppståndelse retade gallfeber på det filosofiska och religiösa tempramentet hos sin samtid. Romarnas Israel för 2000 år sedan, eller Sverige idag, gör det samma – en Andlighet som är livstillvänd är både lockande och skrämmande.
Wednesday, 9 April 2008
Is Divine Simplicity a Perfection according to Aquinas?
Is Divine Simplicity a Perfection according to Aquinas?
Thomas V. Morris, maybe the most important architect of contemporary Perfect-Being Theology, rules out divine simplicity as a necessary attribute for a perfect Being. There are, Morris claims, no persuasive theistically motivated reasons to derive simplicity from the central notion of perfection (the primary source of the Anselmian method). The last claim might be taken to mean that simplicity does not (i) (logically and metaphysically) derive from the notion of perfection. But there is also another possibility, overlooked by Morris: (ii) that at least simplicity is harmonious with perfection. As a matter of fact, what I will argue is that (i) is not necessary for simplicity to qualify as a great-making property. Simplicity, in order to be a great-making property, does not have to be derived from the notion of perfection. This is so because of its peculiar character of being conceptually larger in scope with regards to (most) other divine attributes. Morris anselmianism says just this - that simplicity, in order to be among the great-making properties, has to be conceptually derivable from the notion of perfection. But I disagree with this (order of) analysis. I will instead argue that perfection itself is a larger concept, than what Morris (and maybe many with him) makes it out to be. My claim is the following: perfection and simplicity are related in a conceptual tandem, not (merely) by implication. I take this to be a central idea in Aquinas development of the doctrine of God in his both Summae. Hence, (ii), or something along those lines, would by the same token be a better position for any Perfect-Being Theologian.
Motivation for Divine Simplicity
Morris argues that property and temporal simplicity might be concepts that follows from the notion of divine independence or aseity, which are considered as clear divine perfections. Albeit he says that independence and aseity really do not give us any good reasons to accept simplicity since it merely gives us an extra theoretical construct to uphold. So simplicity, according to Morris, is, if at all derivable, derived in the three steps – from perfection to aseity to simplicity. Since aseity instructively explicates the mode of existence of a Perfect Being but simplicity does not - rather it obscures it according to Morris - he feels that simplicity in any thoroughgoing theistic fashion should be rejected as superfluous unless someone shows that so is not the case.
Contrary to Morris contention, there are obviously different ways of arguing simplicity. I would like to challenge Morris derivation by looking at how Aquinas thought of the matter. The most common way to conceive of divine simplicity might be that of negation of composition in God. Aquinas says in his Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences:
God is the first, who gives being to all things. His being, therefore, does not depend on something else. But the being of any composite thing depends on components, and when those components have been removed, the being of the composite thing is destroyed both in the thing as well as in the mind. God is, therefore, not composite. (I Sent, 8, 4).
If a thing has parts, it can also change and be destroyed if the parts are changed or destroyed. That God is indestructible and stable are not matters of great controversy in classical theism (irregardless of our mereological thinking about the divine nature). Contingent beings borrow or ‘have’ their properties whereas God, as a non-contingent being, does not borrow his properties from other beings. He is his properties. To be composite is to be made up of the constituitive elements according to the mode of being and existence of a certain thing. God is not “made up” in any way.
In this way we see that God, according to Aquinas, is never considered a “being in general” but being itself (ipsum esse). Nothing else in the great chain of being merits this ontological status (Cf. argument from De ente et Essentia ch. IV). It is in virtue of being ontologically first that makes him independent on parts for his essence and existence. Nothing has caused his existence or mode of being. Being the first in the order of reality is a states of affairs that nothing else but that which is the most perfect can obtain. God is an esse sine additione, a being without addition because his perfection is from himself.
Here we see the interplay between simplicity and perfection in Aquinas. Common objects in the created order are be determined and perfected by qualities added to it. This is a common way we distinguish one thing from another. God is distinguished in a radically different way: by not being able to receive any further determinations or perfections as all other beings can; God cannot enter as a subject into any genus or species.
Say we still concur with Morris’ (and Mann et al) claim that the main philosophical motivation to argue simplicity would be derived from aseity which is a (less rich but more) common great-making property among theists. But this method is the not that of Aquinas since aseity is a notion that follows from simplicity. God is independent because he is simple, creatures are dependent beings since they are composed.
It looks, though, from the structure of the Summa Contra Gentiles that simplicity follows from other metaphysical considerations. However, I am not convinced that Aquinas had radically changed his mind when writing the Summa Theologica where he puts simplicity right at the beginning, after the demonstration of the existence of God. It is true that simplicity receives a more prominent, not to say, dominant, place in what follows through the rest of the books of the large Summa. Nevertheless this should not lead us to think that simplicity is Aquinas’ primary or only consideration from which everything, at least with regards to the concept of God, can be derived. Aquinas is not a simple Simple-Being Theologian!
Aquinas is a Simple-and-Perfect-Being Theologian, not a Simple-Being Theologian because he is a Perfect-Being Theologian first. Perfection is put close to the beginning (ST I, qq. 4-6 where goodness is interlinked with perfection) and together with simplicity it earns the central place of theology proper, by being concepts that controls the other attributes. God is simple and perfect in his wisdom, power, truth and so on. So for instance it is in keeping with both intuitions – simplicity and perfection - that Aquinas says that God has knowledge since knowledge is a great-making property and that God’s knowledge is somehow simple ST I, q. 14. So perfection controls and modifies notions we attribute to God together with simplicity. I am leaving all the potential problems of ‘simple intellection’ and the like aside here and merely point to the direction and structure of his thought on this matter. Let us therefore now turn to the notion of divine simplicity and its relation to perfection.
Positive and Negative Theology
I would hence like to characterise simplicity and perfection as two sides of the same theological coin and that we need both in philosophical theology in order not to fall of one either side of the horse. Not all students of Aquinas’ philosophical theology and especially his doctrine of God has recognised this dual complementarity of simplicity and perfection. One who uplifting and recent exception is Rudi te Velde in his book on Aquinas doctrine of God (Ashgate, 2007). There is almost an endless stream of more and less likely understandings of Aquinas. Some interpreters of Aquinas want to make him an essentially negative theologian often with reference to the start of the Summa Theologica which strikes a remarkably negative cord saying that we cannot know God in himself, only as he is from his effects and how he is not (quomodo non sit). From there, via the demonstration for the existence of God, he seems to derive divine simplicity which is formulated as a series of negations of God and especially in his relation to the created world. God is neither spatial nor temporal, nor composed of substance and accidents, matter and form nor essence and existence. The main positive affirmation in q. 3 is the identity of essence and existence. This affirmation is the touchstone for his distinction from the created order and how he differs from it. The distinction between God and the world comes down to being essentially composed or essentially non-composed. This intuition seems then to work itself backwards into perfection since in God’s perfect nature there is no distinction between essence and existence. It is a kind of chicken and egg problem to try to tease out what comes first – simplicity or perfection – in the order of Aquinas analysis.
In SCG I Aquinas calls God a “universially perfect being”:
But for a thing that is its own being it is proper to be according to the whole power of being. For example, if there were a separately existing whiteness, it could not lack any of the power of whiteness. For a given white thing lacks something of the power of whiteness through a defect in the receiver of the whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness. God, therefore, Who is His being, as we have proved above, has being according to the whole power of being itself. Hence, He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any given thing. (SCG, Ch. XXVIII [2], trans. Pegis).
Excellences (nobilitas) in every genus of created order is first found in God in a supreme way, a way that is according to him own being, namely according to his own essence. God is never a receiver but always a fountain of excellences which we generically predicate of creatures by similitude to the divine perfection. Hence everything that is called excellent or perfect in the created order is somehow grounded in the divine nature. This gives motivation for proceeding with Perfect-Being Theology since the perfections found in creatures are also found, in a simple way in God. And this is nothing other than the Pseudo-Dionysian way of negation and affirmation in successive steps. It is through the created order we first come to single out what excellencies might be suitable to a universally perfect being but then we need to negate all imperfection before applying it to God. Wisdom is found in creation in wise human beings, but in a defective way since it is not present in its fullness. We suspect there is more to wisdom than the wisdom of Confusius, Socrates or maybe even Jesus (though Scripture says that all the treasures of divine wisdom are hidden in him). This benevolent suspicion about creaturely wisdom leads our thought to divine wisdom. There is a certain kind of lack in the wisdom of Socrates and that is not the case with God. God’s wisdom is full, not lacking anything. Now, we should not confuse things and claim that any kind of method will be able to tell exactly what truth conditions wisdom has for God. Certainly, considering the incomensummerable differences between God and Socrates, the conditions will be very different. Being able to state exactly the differences in truth condition between divine and human wisdom is not necessary for us being able to say that it is true that both Socrates and God are wise, though not exactly in the same way. We can suggest that the main difference is that God has wisdom simply and perfectly, even though that is still begging the question of what it is for a divine being to have wisdom since it for such a Being must (at least created beings) be unsearchable, as Scripture affirms.
At the end of this section (‘On perfection’) in SCG, Aquinas throws out a warning for overbelief in perfection language. What is not made (factum non est) cannot be called perfect (perfectum) since perfection in Latin means that something comes to be more excellent through a process. Perfection signifies a process of becoming or of potency being actualised. It is only by extension of creaturely language we can call God perfect. God is not, properly speaking, a being which has latent potencies that need to be actualised since he is pure act (actus purus). In other words, Aquinas is modest as to the result of the Perfect-Being methodology because of his basic understanding of God as a simple being which has no potentialities.
From what we have just seen, Aquinas approach to theological method is to keep the tension between kataphatic and apophatic theology without giving priority to one over the other. Now, there is a sense in which the kataphatic is primary because something positive first need to be stated in order to negate (to paraphrase Duns Scotus who’s position is not to different form Aquinas, but still different enough to suspect a kataphatic overemphasis). Affirmations about God always have to be modified against the kind of being God is, the divine modus essendi, and therefore no positive thing can be stated before these negative clarifications are established and imbedded in the affirmation. But the negation of affirmation of corporeality and temporality of God are not affirmations that are supposed to be ultimate estimations. These affirmations are merely dialectically introduced just to be negated and then to reach true affirmations - in-corporeality and a-temporeality. Aquinas thinks that for God, to be atemporal and incorporeal, are qualities, insofar as we can wall them qualities, that are worthy only of a Perfect Being. To state that God is simple is to say what he not is, and saying that in relation to the created order. Perfect-Being Theology, if it is given free range might easily forget the creaturely restrictions Aquinas has in mind. It might try talking about God as he is in himself. To say that God is simple is not really to say what God is (positively) and hence no positive affirmation. To say that God is simple is an affirmation of a negation about God in relation to creation; i.e. to affirm that the absence of qualities like corporeality and temporality in God is true. So to ask the question whether simplicity is a divine perfection simpliciter is to ask a strange question for a thomist perspective since the very notion of perfection is so intimately tied up with that of simplicity.
Conclusion
Many theists would perhaps not be too motivated or agree with the basic tenets of Perfect-Being Theology since it seems to rationalistic since it derives the whole idea of divinity from one single concept: absolute perfection. Questions about the knowability and applicability of such concepts must be challenged. Certainly the more articulate Perfect-Being Theologians would not claim that perfection is the only source of knowledge of the divine but would happily say that perfection works together with such approaches to knowledge of God as biblical revelation, creation theology and mystical theology. I hope to have indicated in this article that Perfect-Being Theology is more attractive if we include divine simplicity as a basic conceptual source. Simplicity is the negative side and perfection the positive side of the same theological coin.
Thomas V. Morris, maybe the most important architect of contemporary Perfect-Being Theology, rules out divine simplicity as a necessary attribute for a perfect Being. There are, Morris claims, no persuasive theistically motivated reasons to derive simplicity from the central notion of perfection (the primary source of the Anselmian method). The last claim might be taken to mean that simplicity does not (i) (logically and metaphysically) derive from the notion of perfection. But there is also another possibility, overlooked by Morris: (ii) that at least simplicity is harmonious with perfection. As a matter of fact, what I will argue is that (i) is not necessary for simplicity to qualify as a great-making property. Simplicity, in order to be a great-making property, does not have to be derived from the notion of perfection. This is so because of its peculiar character of being conceptually larger in scope with regards to (most) other divine attributes. Morris anselmianism says just this - that simplicity, in order to be among the great-making properties, has to be conceptually derivable from the notion of perfection. But I disagree with this (order of) analysis. I will instead argue that perfection itself is a larger concept, than what Morris (and maybe many with him) makes it out to be. My claim is the following: perfection and simplicity are related in a conceptual tandem, not (merely) by implication. I take this to be a central idea in Aquinas development of the doctrine of God in his both Summae. Hence, (ii), or something along those lines, would by the same token be a better position for any Perfect-Being Theologian.
Motivation for Divine Simplicity
Morris argues that property and temporal simplicity might be concepts that follows from the notion of divine independence or aseity, which are considered as clear divine perfections. Albeit he says that independence and aseity really do not give us any good reasons to accept simplicity since it merely gives us an extra theoretical construct to uphold. So simplicity, according to Morris, is, if at all derivable, derived in the three steps – from perfection to aseity to simplicity. Since aseity instructively explicates the mode of existence of a Perfect Being but simplicity does not - rather it obscures it according to Morris - he feels that simplicity in any thoroughgoing theistic fashion should be rejected as superfluous unless someone shows that so is not the case.
Contrary to Morris contention, there are obviously different ways of arguing simplicity. I would like to challenge Morris derivation by looking at how Aquinas thought of the matter. The most common way to conceive of divine simplicity might be that of negation of composition in God. Aquinas says in his Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences:
God is the first, who gives being to all things. His being, therefore, does not depend on something else. But the being of any composite thing depends on components, and when those components have been removed, the being of the composite thing is destroyed both in the thing as well as in the mind. God is, therefore, not composite. (I Sent, 8, 4).
If a thing has parts, it can also change and be destroyed if the parts are changed or destroyed. That God is indestructible and stable are not matters of great controversy in classical theism (irregardless of our mereological thinking about the divine nature). Contingent beings borrow or ‘have’ their properties whereas God, as a non-contingent being, does not borrow his properties from other beings. He is his properties. To be composite is to be made up of the constituitive elements according to the mode of being and existence of a certain thing. God is not “made up” in any way.
In this way we see that God, according to Aquinas, is never considered a “being in general” but being itself (ipsum esse). Nothing else in the great chain of being merits this ontological status (Cf. argument from De ente et Essentia ch. IV). It is in virtue of being ontologically first that makes him independent on parts for his essence and existence. Nothing has caused his existence or mode of being. Being the first in the order of reality is a states of affairs that nothing else but that which is the most perfect can obtain. God is an esse sine additione, a being without addition because his perfection is from himself.
Here we see the interplay between simplicity and perfection in Aquinas. Common objects in the created order are be determined and perfected by qualities added to it. This is a common way we distinguish one thing from another. God is distinguished in a radically different way: by not being able to receive any further determinations or perfections as all other beings can; God cannot enter as a subject into any genus or species.
Say we still concur with Morris’ (and Mann et al) claim that the main philosophical motivation to argue simplicity would be derived from aseity which is a (less rich but more) common great-making property among theists. But this method is the not that of Aquinas since aseity is a notion that follows from simplicity. God is independent because he is simple, creatures are dependent beings since they are composed.
It looks, though, from the structure of the Summa Contra Gentiles that simplicity follows from other metaphysical considerations. However, I am not convinced that Aquinas had radically changed his mind when writing the Summa Theologica where he puts simplicity right at the beginning, after the demonstration of the existence of God. It is true that simplicity receives a more prominent, not to say, dominant, place in what follows through the rest of the books of the large Summa. Nevertheless this should not lead us to think that simplicity is Aquinas’ primary or only consideration from which everything, at least with regards to the concept of God, can be derived. Aquinas is not a simple Simple-Being Theologian!
Aquinas is a Simple-and-Perfect-Being Theologian, not a Simple-Being Theologian because he is a Perfect-Being Theologian first. Perfection is put close to the beginning (ST I, qq. 4-6 where goodness is interlinked with perfection) and together with simplicity it earns the central place of theology proper, by being concepts that controls the other attributes. God is simple and perfect in his wisdom, power, truth and so on. So for instance it is in keeping with both intuitions – simplicity and perfection - that Aquinas says that God has knowledge since knowledge is a great-making property and that God’s knowledge is somehow simple ST I, q. 14. So perfection controls and modifies notions we attribute to God together with simplicity. I am leaving all the potential problems of ‘simple intellection’ and the like aside here and merely point to the direction and structure of his thought on this matter. Let us therefore now turn to the notion of divine simplicity and its relation to perfection.
Positive and Negative Theology
I would hence like to characterise simplicity and perfection as two sides of the same theological coin and that we need both in philosophical theology in order not to fall of one either side of the horse. Not all students of Aquinas’ philosophical theology and especially his doctrine of God has recognised this dual complementarity of simplicity and perfection. One who uplifting and recent exception is Rudi te Velde in his book on Aquinas doctrine of God (Ashgate, 2007). There is almost an endless stream of more and less likely understandings of Aquinas. Some interpreters of Aquinas want to make him an essentially negative theologian often with reference to the start of the Summa Theologica which strikes a remarkably negative cord saying that we cannot know God in himself, only as he is from his effects and how he is not (quomodo non sit). From there, via the demonstration for the existence of God, he seems to derive divine simplicity which is formulated as a series of negations of God and especially in his relation to the created world. God is neither spatial nor temporal, nor composed of substance and accidents, matter and form nor essence and existence. The main positive affirmation in q. 3 is the identity of essence and existence. This affirmation is the touchstone for his distinction from the created order and how he differs from it. The distinction between God and the world comes down to being essentially composed or essentially non-composed. This intuition seems then to work itself backwards into perfection since in God’s perfect nature there is no distinction between essence and existence. It is a kind of chicken and egg problem to try to tease out what comes first – simplicity or perfection – in the order of Aquinas analysis.
In SCG I Aquinas calls God a “universially perfect being”:
But for a thing that is its own being it is proper to be according to the whole power of being. For example, if there were a separately existing whiteness, it could not lack any of the power of whiteness. For a given white thing lacks something of the power of whiteness through a defect in the receiver of the whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness. God, therefore, Who is His being, as we have proved above, has being according to the whole power of being itself. Hence, He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any given thing. (SCG, Ch. XXVIII [2], trans. Pegis).
Excellences (nobilitas) in every genus of created order is first found in God in a supreme way, a way that is according to him own being, namely according to his own essence. God is never a receiver but always a fountain of excellences which we generically predicate of creatures by similitude to the divine perfection. Hence everything that is called excellent or perfect in the created order is somehow grounded in the divine nature. This gives motivation for proceeding with Perfect-Being Theology since the perfections found in creatures are also found, in a simple way in God. And this is nothing other than the Pseudo-Dionysian way of negation and affirmation in successive steps. It is through the created order we first come to single out what excellencies might be suitable to a universally perfect being but then we need to negate all imperfection before applying it to God. Wisdom is found in creation in wise human beings, but in a defective way since it is not present in its fullness. We suspect there is more to wisdom than the wisdom of Confusius, Socrates or maybe even Jesus (though Scripture says that all the treasures of divine wisdom are hidden in him). This benevolent suspicion about creaturely wisdom leads our thought to divine wisdom. There is a certain kind of lack in the wisdom of Socrates and that is not the case with God. God’s wisdom is full, not lacking anything. Now, we should not confuse things and claim that any kind of method will be able to tell exactly what truth conditions wisdom has for God. Certainly, considering the incomensummerable differences between God and Socrates, the conditions will be very different. Being able to state exactly the differences in truth condition between divine and human wisdom is not necessary for us being able to say that it is true that both Socrates and God are wise, though not exactly in the same way. We can suggest that the main difference is that God has wisdom simply and perfectly, even though that is still begging the question of what it is for a divine being to have wisdom since it for such a Being must (at least created beings) be unsearchable, as Scripture affirms.
At the end of this section (‘On perfection’) in SCG, Aquinas throws out a warning for overbelief in perfection language. What is not made (factum non est) cannot be called perfect (perfectum) since perfection in Latin means that something comes to be more excellent through a process. Perfection signifies a process of becoming or of potency being actualised. It is only by extension of creaturely language we can call God perfect. God is not, properly speaking, a being which has latent potencies that need to be actualised since he is pure act (actus purus). In other words, Aquinas is modest as to the result of the Perfect-Being methodology because of his basic understanding of God as a simple being which has no potentialities.
From what we have just seen, Aquinas approach to theological method is to keep the tension between kataphatic and apophatic theology without giving priority to one over the other. Now, there is a sense in which the kataphatic is primary because something positive first need to be stated in order to negate (to paraphrase Duns Scotus who’s position is not to different form Aquinas, but still different enough to suspect a kataphatic overemphasis). Affirmations about God always have to be modified against the kind of being God is, the divine modus essendi, and therefore no positive thing can be stated before these negative clarifications are established and imbedded in the affirmation. But the negation of affirmation of corporeality and temporality of God are not affirmations that are supposed to be ultimate estimations. These affirmations are merely dialectically introduced just to be negated and then to reach true affirmations - in-corporeality and a-temporeality. Aquinas thinks that for God, to be atemporal and incorporeal, are qualities, insofar as we can wall them qualities, that are worthy only of a Perfect Being. To state that God is simple is to say what he not is, and saying that in relation to the created order. Perfect-Being Theology, if it is given free range might easily forget the creaturely restrictions Aquinas has in mind. It might try talking about God as he is in himself. To say that God is simple is not really to say what God is (positively) and hence no positive affirmation. To say that God is simple is an affirmation of a negation about God in relation to creation; i.e. to affirm that the absence of qualities like corporeality and temporality in God is true. So to ask the question whether simplicity is a divine perfection simpliciter is to ask a strange question for a thomist perspective since the very notion of perfection is so intimately tied up with that of simplicity.
Conclusion
Many theists would perhaps not be too motivated or agree with the basic tenets of Perfect-Being Theology since it seems to rationalistic since it derives the whole idea of divinity from one single concept: absolute perfection. Questions about the knowability and applicability of such concepts must be challenged. Certainly the more articulate Perfect-Being Theologians would not claim that perfection is the only source of knowledge of the divine but would happily say that perfection works together with such approaches to knowledge of God as biblical revelation, creation theology and mystical theology. I hope to have indicated in this article that Perfect-Being Theology is more attractive if we include divine simplicity as a basic conceptual source. Simplicity is the negative side and perfection the positive side of the same theological coin.
Monday, 16 April 2007
Radical Orthodoxy Bibliography in English - as promissed!
Radical Orthodoxy bibliography (2007)
This bibliography is intended to be a short guide for people interested in the Radical Orthodoxy movement and contemporary issues in theology. I am merely mentioning and commenting on some of the sources here, without any claims of being objective. For the one who is interested in a fuller bibliography I can recommend James Smith’s (see below). These sources can and should bee taken together with the other published bibliography on the
Milbank, John; Pickstock, Catherine; Ward, Graham, A New Theology: Radical Orthodoxy (
This is the book that started it all. It is the New Testament of RO! A group of theologians, many still doing their PhDs, gathered for a conference in
Milbank, John, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
If the book above is the New Testament, this one is the Old. It was written as am ideological preamble of what later became RO. It is a sharp criticism (though often as complicated as it is dubious in its arguments) of how modern, mainly European, theology has given in to secularism. Theology has been done, not from a theological perspective primarily but from the paradigm of social science. Even if its criticism is well needed I think the way there is one that I would not share.
Smith, James, K.A. Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology.
This is my favourite introduction to RO. The first chapters which are an orientation in modern theology are worth reading on its own even if RO is not ones interest. The book is written from a Protestant-Reformed perspective (Kuyper, Doyerweerd) which is no secret. The fact that the writer is writing from an open perspective makes it an extra interesting read as he tries to show overlaps between theological strands and makes suggestions for how the conversation can go further. Don’t miss the controversial yet stimulating use of Leibniz metaphysics as a way to redeem creational theology! Sadly Smith is not able to make any good contribution to RO’s view of the history/genealogy of ideas which is so central to the whole project. For instance he is merely repeating the supra-Augustinian Aquinas and the historically misinformed interpretation of Scotus’ ideas heavily influenced by Etienne Gilson’s grand yet biased views. For a what should be an ultimate defeater for this old school interpretation see Riochard Cross’ great and intricate article, "'Where Angels Fear to Tread': Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy," in Antonianum 76.1 (2001): 7-41. This criticism aside, his voice is well needed and welcome in the RO conversation.
Here is Smith’s biliography:
http://www.calvin.edu/%7Ejks4/ro/robib.pdf
Some relevant homepages:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_orthodoxy
http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/
http://www.calvin.edu/~jks4/ro/ [Smith’s homepage]
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1994
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0002/articles/reno.html [A good article from a good Roman Catholic Journal!]
http://ressourcement.blogspot.com/ [Since RO has its deepest historical and ideological roots in the Roman Catholic 20th century reform movement Nouvelle Theologie I cannot neglect mentioning this homepage.]
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